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Restricting the Use of "Sound-Alikes" in
Commercial Speech by Amending the
Right of Publicity Statute in California
INTRODUCTION
As the entertainment and advertising media continue to prolifer-
ate in our society, the sale of celebrity personas' in connection with
the promotion of commercial products has become big business.2 Ad-
vertisers use celebrities to promote a variety of products in an in-
creasing array of mediums ranging from television and radio to print
and direct mail pieces. Recently, a new breed of advertisements sur-
faced in the radio and television arena which use an imitation of a
I. The federal courts generally define a "celebrity" as a person whose name is "a
'household' word whose ideas and actions the public in fact follows with great inter-
est .... In undertaking this examination, a court must look through the eyes of a rea-
sonable person." Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
Another federal court has discussed celebrity status, noting that "[s]uch persons [ce-
lebrities] have knowingly relinquished their anonymity in return for fame, fortune, or
influence. They are frequently so famous that they 'may be able to transfer their recogni-
tion and influence from one field to another.'" Tavoulareas v. Piro and The Washington
Post Co., 817 F.2d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294
n.15).
2. Pepsi was a frontrunner in offering celebrities large sums of money to appear in
commercials endorsing its product in 1984 with a five million dollar sponsorship of the
Jackson's concert tour. Levine, The Paths of Glory Lead But to an Endorsement, AD-
WEEKS MKTG. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 3. Recently, Coke and Pepsi both spent an esti-
mated three million dollars each to land teen idols George Michael and Madonna for a
television commercial appearance. Id.
According to one talent agent who has lined up such big-name celebrities as Bob
Hope, Roger Moo're, and Carol Channing for commercials, "[n]obody is unreachable
because money talks." Commercials: Few Unreachable for Testimonials, TV/RADIO
AGE, Jan. 20, 1986, at 49.
distinctive celebrity voice in order to attract attention to a product.
These advertisements are termed "sound-alike" commercials since
they involve a third person who attempts to sound like a particular
celebrity.3
When product promoters realize that infusing a celebrity's identity
into their product will inevitably be a profitable venture, they are
increasingly willing to pay large sums of money for the privilege of
using a celebrity's identity; substantial benefits may be involved.4
However, in some instances a promoter is unwilling to pay the high
price that a particular celebrity demands or the promoter finds that
he or she is simply unable to persuade the celebrity to endorse a
product. Such a situation sets the perimeters for this Comment since
a celebrity's decision to avoid engaging in certain promotional activi-
ties frequently leads to the violation of a celebrity's right to control
his or her persona, especially in the context of "sound-alike" adver-
tisements. A further illustration of this problem is provided in the
following hypothetical fact situation.
5
An advertising agency decides to use a popular song in a television
commercial to attract a "Yuppie" target audience by invoking col-
lege memories. However, as is often the case, the celebrity who origi-
nally made the song famous refuses to perform in the commercial.
The alternative available to the agency is to hire another singer who
is instructed to imitate the celebrity's original recording. In an effort
to legally protect itself, the agency adds a disclaimer at the end of
the commercial that states: "celebrity voice impersonated."
Immediately after the commercial hits the television airwaves, the
celebrity's colleagues inform her that the voice in the commercial
sounded exactly like her voice. More importantly, her agent informs
her that the public has reacted in much the same way by miscon-
struing the voice in the commercial for her voice. Her first reaction
is anger over the fact that the agency achieved the same benefit from
their "sound-alike" commercial as they would have received if she
had performed the song herself. The celebrity believes that by doing
so, they wrongfully avoided paying the high price she would have
demanded if she had agreed to perform in the commercial.
3. Kent, Rights of Celebrities, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
4. Promoters realize they must initially project some attractive image to their tar-
get audience simply to gain their attention. This was an advertising truism as far back as
1758, as evidenced by Samuel Johnson's statement: "Advertisements are now so numer-
ous that they are very negligently perused, and it has therefore become necessary to gain
attention by magnificence of promises and by eloquence sometimes sublime and some-
times pathetick." S. JOHNSON, THE IDLER (1758), reprinted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS
5 (G. Seldes ed. 1977).
5. The author draws this hypothetical almost exclusively from the fact pattern of
Midler v. Ford Motor, Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), which is discussed in further
detail within this Comment. See infra notes 77-81, 83, 85, 88, 89 and accompanying
text.
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In addition to feeling that the agency was unjustly enriched by
using the "sound-alike" singer, the celebrity contends that she suf-
fered a significant blow to her professional reputation as a result of
the commercial. As evidenced by the confusion experienced by her
colleagues and the general public, she justifiably fears that consum-
ers will mistakenly believe she endorsed that particular product. In
actuality, she may be well known and publicly admired for deliber-
ately avoiding any association of her personar with commercial prod-
ucts for personal as well as moral reasons.
Although the disclaimer "celebrity voice impersonated" cleverly
serves to avoid a possible misrepresentation claim, the commercial
nevertheless directly focuses the public's attention on the celebrity
image through use of the "sound-alike." This overt act by the adver-
tiser does not necessarily dispel the connection between the celebrity
and the advertised product, since as one scholar noted, "the very act
of disclaiming becomes the act of appropriation."'6 By drawing atten-
tion to the celebrity voice incorporated within the commercial, the
advertiser has ultimately enhanced the product's appeal regardless of
the use of the trailing disclaimer. Therefore, the celebrity maintains
that the blanket disclaimer does not vindicate her rights nor does it
provide a remedy for the economic and intangible reputational harm
she suffered as a result of the "sound-alike" commercial.
With the tremendous growth of the twentieth century media,7 the
question is raised as to the available remedies for celebrities in such
a predicament. The responsibility for that answer has been left to the
legal system.
Generally, the remedy available to a person seeking recovery for
the commercial use of his or her name or likeness, without consent,
is a cause of action for invasion of privacy stated under common law
principles or state statute. However, if a potential plaintiff is a public
figure (a "celebrity"8 ), as a general rule, in every jurisdiction, he or
she is deemed to have waived his or her right of privacy in the eyes
of the law.9
6. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1246 (1986).
7. One scholar noted that "the tremendous strides in media" in the latter part of
this century demand increasing the protection of images. Nimmer, The Right of Public-
ity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954).
8. For the purposes of this Comment, a public figure will be termed a "celebrity."
For a definition of a celebrity, see supra note 1.
9. Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiffs Name or Likeness in Ad-
vertising, 23 A.L.R.3D 865, 901 (1969).
Celebrities need not dismay, however, because during the past
thirty years the legal system has responded by developing the doc-
trine of the right of publicity. The doctrine consists of "the legally
protected interest that public figures have in the publicity value of
their names, images and likenesses."' It entitles the owner of the
right to the exclusive benefit of the economic gain from the right."
The courts have developed and many state legislatures have
broadened the doctrine to protect a celebrity's interest in maintain-
ing exclusive control over "the exploitation of his or her identity's
associative value," the value to advertisers of associating their prod-
uct with the celebrity.' 2 In sum, the doctrine is based on the celeb-
rity's right to be free from the appropriation of his or her name or
likeness by another for the other's financial benefit, since in most
cases the celebrity has expended tremendous resources in the devel-
opment of his or her image.
The right of publicity for celebrities can be invoked in a number
of ways, including: the use of a celebrity's name or likeness to imply
endorsement of a product;'" the use for promotional purposes in or-
der to enhance product identification by the consumer;' 4 and the use
for the primary purposes of increasing a publication's circulation.'
5
Additionally, courts have recently applied the doctrine to an in-
creasing range of personal attributes. 16 These include "proprietary
interests in a 'celebrity's name, likeness, nickname, voice, profes-
sional act, character portrayal, slogan, and possessions associated
with him."' 7 This Comment contends that the invocation of the right
of publicity should similarly be allowed when an imitation of a celeb-
rity's voice is used in commercial speech, such as in the preceding
"sound-alike" hypothetical.
Since the right of publicity is a relatively new doctrine in the legal
arena, only a minimal amount of authority exists espousing this
Comment's premise. William Prosser, in his treatise on tort law, set
forth the contention that the right of privacy, which includes the
10. Comment, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a
Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1703, 1703 (1983); see also Shipley,
Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemp-
tion, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 677 (1981).
11. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1248.
12. Id.
13. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
14. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
15. Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1120 (1982).
16. Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in
the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207, 259 n.229 (1986).
17. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Note, The Right of Publicity, Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act and Copyright Preemption: Preventing the Unauthorized Commercial
Exploitation of Uncopyrighted Works of Art, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 265, 278-79
(1983).
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right of publicity under his analysis, can be invaded "by appropria-
tion of the plaintiff's identity, as by impersonation, without the use
of either his name or likeness."18 Hence, Prosser foreshadowed the
necessity of providing a remedy to a celebrity in a "sound-alike"
situation.
Additional authority upon which this Comment bases its sugges-
tion is found within Midler v. Ford Motor Co., a recent United
States Court of Appeals case which held that the imitation of a pro-
fessional singer's distinctive voice in commercial advertising is an il-
legal appropriation of the singer's identity. In Midler, the court
stated that the singer, Bette Midler, could have gained recovery
under California's right of publicity statute if the statute had only
included protection for "vocal imitation" in its text. 0 The applicable
California statutes states in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness, in any manner. . .for purposes of advertising or selling,
or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without
such person's prior consent. . .shall be liable for any damages sustained by
the person or persons injured as a result thereof.21
This Comment suggests that the California legislature amend the
right of publicity statute to encompass vocal imitations. A statutory
amendment will be proposed within this Comment which would al-
low a celebrity to recover for such "sound-alike" advertisements as
described in the preceding hypothetical. Just as California has found
itself at the forefront of developing legal doctrines in the past, by
following this Comment's recommendation, the legislature would be
taking the initiative to extend the doctrine of the right of publicity to
include vocal imitation. Since California law, in conjunction with
New York, delineates the perimeters and development of the right of
publicity, a California statutory amendment in this area may ulti-
mately be dispositive nationwide.22
As this Comment will establish, the proposed amendment would
necessarily fill an existing void in the legal arena by eliminating the
18. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 n.20 (5th ed. 1984).
19. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. Id.
21. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1990).
22. Similarily, Felix Kent, a renowned authority on advertising law, notes: "Since
many, if not most, celebrities of the entertainment world reside in California, decisions in
the Ninth Circuit are of great weight for the advertising industry." Kent, A New Tune in
Using 'Sound-Alikes', N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1988, at 3, col. 1. Kent's observation would
likewise hold true for decisions made by the California legislature.
unfairness of the current law, which affords "sound-alike" advertis-
ers undeserved windfalls. The amendment would also provide cer-
tainty for celebrities in this murky area of the law which has a
unique basis in California culture.
To achieve this purpose, in Part I, this Comment will provide an
analysis of the evolution and development of the right of publicity.
Part II will then focus on the existing limitations on the right of
publicity that are necessary to protect the first amendment rights of
freedom of speech and expression for the media as a whole and for
impersonators and entertainers who imitate celebrities for the pur-
poses of their performances. Drawing from these legal bases and pol-
icy justifications, Part III will argue that vocal imitations should be
granted protection within a California codification of the right of
publicity. Finally, Part IV will present a suggestion to the California
legislature to amend Civil Code section 3344(a) to afford celebrities
a cause of action against "sound-alike" advertisers by adding the
words "vocal imitation" to the statute.
I. EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity originated from a variety of legal areas,
ranging from copyright and property law to various rights of pri-
vacy.23 Its development has been shaped by the rationales offered by
the courts and scholars in the context of each of these areas of law.
Theories developing from those areas are set out in a "trilogy" of
seminal law review articles.24
A. Privacy Right Analysis
There is a consensus among scholars that the right of publicity
originated from the right of privacy as articulated by Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis in a renowned law review article.2 5 The arti-
cle describes privacy as the "right 'to be let alone.' "26 The rationale
offered on behalf of the right focused on the traditional tort concepts
that the invasion caused personal injury to a person's dignity and
state of mind, as well as causing mental distress.2
However, many problems quickly become apparent when one at-
tempts to analogize the right of publicity to the right of privacy. The
rationales behind the privacy interpretation do not transfer to the
23. McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1987).
24. Id. The "trilogy" of law review articles is: Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Nimmer, supra note 7; and Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy].
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24.
26. Id. at 195 (citing T. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1886)).
27. Id. at 197.
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publicity right. For instance, no privacy argument alleging indignity
or mental distress on the part of a celebrity can be validly asserted
since the celebrity's image has already been spread throughout the
media with the celebrity's consent. As one scholar noted:
[P]rivacy is the one thing they [celebrities] do "not want, or need." Their
concern is rather with publicity, which may be regarded as the reverse side
of the coin of privacy. However. . .[the celebrity does not wish] to have his
name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and publicized without his con-
sent or without remuneration to him.
28
Thus, the right of privacy remedies tend to remain inadequate since
a celebrity's true complaint is that he or she suffered "uncompen-
sated," rather than unwelcome, publicity."2 9 Consequently, this area
of the law was ripe for a new theory which could provide a rationale
more closely related to the right of publicity.
B. Property Right Analysis
Fortunately, a federal court, in the 1953 decision of Haelan Labo-
ratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, provided a new theory, and the
analysis within a second law review article published in 1954 ex-
panded on this theory in its response to the implications of the Hae-
lan case. 0 The phrase "right of publicity" was first coined in Haelan
when the court upheld the rights of a baseball player who assigned
his right of publicity to a company manufacturing chewing gum
cards.3' The importance of this decision is clear; it laid the basis for
the theory that the right of publicity is ultimately based on a prop-
erty right.
The rationale underlying the decision was that a person who has
invested years of practice, effort, or competition in developing a pub-
lic personality should have the exclusive right to realize the mone-
tary profits from his or her marketable status. In line with the pre-
ceding arguments, the court held the right of publicity was an
independent and distinct right from the right of privacy. 2 Thus, the
court recognized a property right in a person's identity.
Additionally, the court found New York law provided an indepen-
28. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 204 (citing Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354,
361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952)).
29. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C.L. REV. 603, 622 (1984).
30. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953);
Nimmer, supra note 7.
31. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1201; Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
32. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
dent common law right protecting economic interests in a celebrity's
personality.3 3 The right was later extended to include not only a per-
son's name and likeness but also that person's reputation and
accomplishments.34
A year after the Haelan decision, Melville Nimmer wrote a law
review article which has been described as "the cornerstone of the
right of publicity. '3 5 After Nimmer set out to expose the deficiencies
inherent in a privacy law analysis of the right of publicity, he sug-
gested that "[t]he right of publicity must be recognized as a prop-
erty right."36
The rationale behind Nimmer's property theory is apparent in the
following statement:
[E]very person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are impor-
tant countervailing public policy considerations. Yet, because of the inade-
quacy of traditional legal theories... persons who have long and laboriously
nurtured the fruit of publicity values may be deprived of them, unless judi-
cial recognition is given to what is here referred to as the right of public-
ity-that is, the right of each person to control and profit from the publicity
values which he has created or purchased.
37
One scholar refines Nimmer's property analysis as follows: "The in-
terest, a function of the societal recognition that commercial value
may be associated with the persona of celebrity, should serve as the
primary tool for shaping the form and content of the right."38
By asserting that the right is a property right, the opinion in Hae-
lan, coupled with the effectiveness of Nimmer's property policy ar-
guments, paved the way for a recognition of an independent common
law right of publicity in federal and state forums.
Finally, William Prosser strengthened the property analysis in his
discussion of the four separate invasions of the right of privacy:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness. 39
It is under the latter category of misappropriation that the right of
publicity has developed, according to Prosser and many other legal
33, Id. It is essential to note the federal court's interpretation of New York law in
the Haelan decision is generally accepted by all jurisdictions since New York is at the
forefront of the doctrine's development. See Halpern, supra note 6, at 1202.
34. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernback, 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1977).
35. McCarthy, supra note 23, at 1706; Nimmer, supra note 7.
36. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 216 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1202.
39. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 24, at 389.
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scholars.4"
The misappropriation of a plaintiff's personality involves a critical
distinction from the other three invasions of privacy in that misap-
propriation can involve not only the right to be let alone but also
"the right to be paid for being 'bothered.' "41 This is often the case
when a celebrity's personality is misappropriated. Hence, a misap-
propriation analysis can be helpful in conjunction with a property
analysis since it is based upon the same rationale of protecting a
celebrity's commercial value in his or her persona.
C. Copyright Law Analysis
Many scholars analogize the right of publicity to copyright law
since one of the major policies underlying copyright law, that copy-
rights provide incentives for enterprise and creativity, also applies to
the right of publicity.42 Just as the issuance of copyrights furnishes
an incentive to create by ensuring artists the ability to reap the bene-
fits of their work, the right of publicity provides "an incentive for
individuals whose 'works of art' consist of their own images .... 13
However, the use of copyright theory as a basis for the development
of the right of publicity has met with a substantial amount of
opposition.
In his previously mentioned law review article, Nimmer distin-
guished the right of publicity from the infringement of copyright
law. 44 Nimmer stated that while copyright infringement requires
proof of the likelihood of confusion regarding a source, or proof of
confused association, some unpermitted advertising uses of a celeb-
rity's identity do not involve false endorsement. 4' For example, many
times promoters use the images of celebrities in their advertisements
without representing in any way to the consumer that the personality
endorsed the product.'6
Based on this foundation, Nimmer set out the test for determining
infringement in right of publicity cases as centering around the fact
that attention has been drawn to a product or its advertisement by
40. Id. at 415.
41. Comment, Privacy, Appropriation, and the First Amendment: A Human Can-
nonball's Rather Rough Landing, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579, 584 (1977).
42. Comment, supra note 10, at 1707.
43. Id.
44. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 212.
45. Id. at 213.
46. McCarthy, supra note 23, at 1709.
an identifiable use of the celebrity's identity. 7 Such a test differs
distinctly in its application and outcomes from the "likely confusion"
test used in trademark and unfair competition law.48
D. The Right of Publicity as a Property and Appropriational
Right
In summary, the policies underlying the right of privacy and copy-
right law fail to adequately present solid rationales for the evolution
of the right of publicity, since both areas of law ultimately protect
interests distinct from those the right of publicity seeks to protect.
Consequently, an analysis of the right of publicity is best undertaken
by using the property law rationale, combined with appropriation
rights, since the value of association of the celebrity's persona is the
major consideration for celebrities seeking remedies under the right
of publicity.
The next section addresses the possible conflict between a celeb-
rity's property right to his or her image and the first amendment
right of free speech.
II. IMMUNIZATION OF ENTERTAINMENT AND NEWSWORTHY
SUBJECTS AS BEYOND THE REACH OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS
First amendment considerations are important to a discussion of
the right of publicity because a question exists as to where to draw
the line between the right of the public to know and disseminate
information about celebrities and an act of misappropriation against
such a celebrity. Considerations favoring dissemination boast strong
allies such as former Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black who
stated, "The constitutional guarantee of a free press rests on the as-
sumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public, that a free press is a condition of a free society."49
Alternatively, celebrities may maintain that they should have ex-
clusive control over their images and the reportage of their private
lives since the media has such a pervasive effect in twentieth century
society. In many instances, celebrities may believe that the press
should be disallowed from invoking their image at all, even in the
context of reporting topical events. Celebrities possess a valid argu-
ment, for, as even the Commission on Freedom of the Press5" was
47. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 212.
48. McCarthy, supra note 23, at 1709.
49. Black, The Supreme Court on Liberty, NEw REPUBLIC, July 2, 1945, at 7.
50. In 1942, an impartial commission of well-respected professors from America's
most renowned universities was formed at the request of Henry R. Luce, founder of
Time, Inc., to study mass communication, evaluate the performance of the media, and to
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forced to concede, "[t]hese instruments [press, radio and other
means of modern mass communication] can spread lies faster and
farther than our forefathers dreamed when they enshrined the free-
dom of the press in the First Amendment to our Constitution."51
Additionally, celebrities may argue that just as freedom of the
press exists for the public and the media's benefits, freedom from the
press's use of a celebrity's persona is similarly an important consider-
ation. In essence, the following statement exemplifies their argu-
ment: "While they shriek for 'freedom of the press' when there is no
slightest threat of that freedom, they deny to citizens that freedom
from the press to which the decencies of life entitle them. They mis-
represent, they distort, they color, they blackguard, they lie."'52
Hence, advocates of either side (free press versus restricted press)
have strong policy and constitutional considerations in their favor.
However, it must be conceded that certain aspects of the right of
publicity doctrine are in direct conflict with the first amendment.5 3
Therefore, a court must "reconcile an individual's private right to
profit from his personality with the need to the public to be informed
about that personality." '54 One scholar noted that when considering
issues of freedom of the press, "the crux is not the publisher's 'free-
dom to print'; it is rather, the citizen's 'right to know.' "55 In sum,
these are the relevant competing considerations that courts are
forced to take into account when dealing with right of publicity
claims.
As the right of publicity doctrine expanded in the state and fed-
eral courts, the media feared a possible chilling effect upon their
ability to report and cover entertainment and topical issues. One
scholar recognized the trend as signaling a "dramatic reduction in
press freedom."56
make recommendations for possible regulation of the press. This commission was named
the Commission on Freedom of the Press. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
FOREWORD TO A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS V (1947).
51. Id. at 3.
52. Ickes, America's House of Lords, reprinted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 391
(G. Seldes ed. 1977).
53. Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Com-
mercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1129 (1980). "[W]hen an individual exer-
cises control through a right of publicity, there often is a significant conflict between that
action and the First Amendment interest in the general use of information." Id.
54. Note, Invasion of Privacy and the First Amendment: Zacchini Makes the
Press Pay, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 561, 561 (1978).
55. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Aug. 28, 1956, reprinted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS
394 (G. Seldes ed. 1977).
56. Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy Claims - Decline in Constitutional
It appeared that this fear was well-founded after the 1977 United
States Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard.
5 7
In Zacchini, a television station broadcast a performer's entire live
act against his wishes. The Court allowed the performer to recover
against the station based on an infringement of his right of publicity.
The Court held that a state may decide that an individual's right of
publicity sometimes outweighs the freedom of the press.58 If the indi-
vidual can prove injury based on the broadcast or publication, dam-
ages should be awarded. The media feared the potential implications
of such a decision which, in principle, negated their usual defense of
newsworthiness.
Regardless of the apparent harsh effect of Zacchini, the media has
been afforded a great deal of protection from the erosion of the free
speech doctrine since the right of publicity is not generally applied to
magazine or newspaper articles, history, books, plays, biographies,
and other factual subjects of public interests. 59 These media forms
are beyond the reach of the right of publicity.60 Since these forms
are protected, it cannot be validly asserted that the right of publicity
completely outweighs the media's freedom of expression.6
Several cases since Zacchini have upheld media first amendment
claims over a celebrity's right of publicity where literary works were
involved or where the medium's purpose was not commercial. For
instance, in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, the court used "a balanc-
ing test between society's interest in the speech for which protection
is sought and the societal. . .interests. . .seeking to restrain such
speech" and subsequently disallowed the right of publicity claim. 2
The court held that books and movies should be considered "vehicles
through which ideas and opinions are disseminated and, as such,
have enjoyed certain constitutional protections. 6 3 Similarly, courts
have held that the right of publicity does not apply when a celeb-
rity's name or picture is used in connection with the dissemination of
news or matters of public interest, since both of these are vehicles
Protection for the Press, 66 Ky. L.J. 759, 797 (1978).
57. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
58. Id. at 578.
59. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1252.
60. Although an obvious difficulty becomes apparent when one tries to draw a
clear line between what type of speech can be classified as newsworthy as opposed to
being purely commercial, the California courts have developed a three-part test that is
helpful in distinguishing the two competing types of speech. The "three-part test for
newsworthiness" includes analysis of the following factors: "(a) The social value of the
facts published; (b) the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly private affairs; and (c) the
extent to which an individual voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety."
Wasser v. San Diego Union, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1455, 1461, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776
(1987).
61. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1252.
62. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
63. Id. at 430.
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through which ideas and opinions are disseminated.6 4
Similarly, Eastwood v. Superior Court, a California appellate
court decision, establishes this premise in an extensive opinion.6 5 In
Eastwood, Clint Eastwood brought a cause of action against the Na-
tional Enquirer magazine for infringement of his right of publicity.
He based his complaint on a story printed by the National Enquirer
which related his purported romantic involvement in a love triangle.
Eastwood's claim was held insufficient to make the magazine's con-
duct actionable under the common law or California's right of pub-
licity statute.6
The court established that "[p]ublication of matters in the public
interest. . .to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable.167 The court
then continued by providing a definition of matters in the public in-
terest: "The privilege of printing an account of happenings and of
enlightening the public as to matters of interest is not restricted to
current events; magazines and books, radio and television may legiti-
mately inform and entertain the public with the reproduction of past
events, travelogues and biographies." 68
The court set out that Eastwood, by creating a legitimate amount
of public attention through his accomplishments as an actor, had a
public interest attached to himself.69 Hence, "a celebrity has relin-
quished 'a part of his right of privacy to the extent that the public
has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs or character.' "0
The court precluded liability against the National Enquirer be-
cause it found the public concern with Eastwood's life precluded its
imposition. The court refused to extend the right of publicity to this
type of celebrity claim and stated "[a]bsolute protection of the press
in the case at bench requires a total sacrifice of the competing inter-
est of Eastwood in controlling the commercial exploitation of his per-
sonality."'7 The court concluded by holding that "[t]he scope of the
privilege extends to almost all reporting of recent events even though
it involves the publication of a purely private person's name or
likeness." '72
64. Bauman v. Anson, 6 Med. L. Rptr. [BNA] 1487, 1491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
65. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
66. Id. at 421, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
67. Id. (citing Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 746, 20
Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (1962)).
68. Id. (citing Carlisle, 201 Cal. App. 2d at 746, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414).
69. Id. at 422, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
70. Id. (citing Carlisle, 201 Cal. App. 2d at 747, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414).
71. Id.
72. Id.
As evidenced by the above-cited discussions of case law, it seems,
in the context of right of publicity cases, courts continue to recognize
that the freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed in most
instances and that the publication of daily news is a necessary public
function. Consequently, the doctrine of the right of publicity does
not prevent the media from continuing to rake celebrity muck. This
allowance is based in part upon the following policy consideration:
When there is muck to be raked, it must be raked, and the public must
know of it, that it may mete out justice. . . . Publicity is a great purifier
because it sets in action the forces of public opinion, and in this country
public opinion controls the courses of the nation.7 3
Just as courts protect celebrity "muckraking," they are likewise
careful to balance all competing interests to protect celebrity parody
and impersonation acts.7 4 Since entertainment remains unaffected by
the right of publicity, a comic would not have to pay to do an im-
pression of a celebrity. The comic is not appropriating the celebrity's
persona in order to sell a commercial product, an instance where
reimbursement to the celebrity would be in order. Instead, the comic
is engaged in a form of entertainment which invokes imitation of the
celebrity voice. However, that particular form of entertainment fo-
cuses on the comic's talents which enable him or her to engage in
effective impersonation. Obviously, an argument exists that the
comic is in essence selling the celebrity's persona for his own com-
mercial benefit. However, the entertainment value to the public of
such abilities would be held to outweigh the imposition of the doc-
trine of the right of publicity to acts of comic impersonation.
Although the above discussion appears to preclude the right of
publicity from ever outweighing freedom of expression,75 right of
publicity cases do involve a delicate balance between the media's
right to inform the public about newsworthy people and the celeb-
rity's right to enjoy the monetary and reputational benefits of hard
work. For that reason, the law has attempted to create such a bal-
ance, yet the scales are not weighted evenly. In reality, the right of
publicity probably does place some measure of a chilling effect on
creators in the entertainment and media fields. However, it appears
evident that while celebrities can protect the value of their commer-
cial exploitation, they cannot exempt themselves from social com-
mentary, as was demonstrated in Eastwood.
Commercial speech has been accorded less first amendment pro-
tection than other forms of speech as it has been regulated more
vigorously by the courts and the Federal Communications Commis-
73. Charles Evans Hughes, Address to the Manufacturer's Association (May
1908), reprinted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONs 676 (G. Seldes ed. 1977).
74. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1253.
75. Id. at 1252.
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sion. The United States Supreme Court has "afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values. .... ,,76
As a result, courts already have the propensity to balance interests
within the commercial speech area and have established precedents
to deal effectively with any chilling effects upon the media in that
area. It is important to note at this juncture that the scope of sound-
alikes relates only to commercial speech, as opposed to speech that
justifiably requires stronger protection because of its newsworthy
value. Therefore, the suggestion that celebrities be allowed recovery
for vocal imitations would not stretch beyond the perimeters of com-
mercial speech, thus exempting entertainment and newsworthy sub-
jects as discussed above.
In Part III, and analysis of the Midler v. Ford Motor Co. decision
is undertaken. That decision provides support for allowing the right
of publicity to protect celebrities against "sound-alike" advertise-
ments in purely commercial speech.
III. THE MIDLER V. FORD MOTOR Co. DECISION: A FOOTHOLD
FOR STRONGER LEGISLATIVE ACTION
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., an advertising agency deliberately
hired an imitator to impersonate Bette Midler's singing voice for a
television commercial. In a unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that Midler's voice was of such great value
to the advertising agency that the agency should be required to reim-
burse Midler for the market value of the performance as if it was
actually performed by her." The court decided that a celebrity
should be allowed recovery under the right of publicity for the com-
mercial imitation of his or her voice since "[a] voice is as distinctive
and personal as a face."
78
The judges agreed that the imitation violated a common law prop-
erty right which Midler possessed in her own voice. It was obvious to
the court that the advertising agency "used an imitation to convey
the impression that Midler was singing for them."' 7" Hence, by seek-
ing to use an attribute of Midler's identity without compensation,
the court inferred that the advertising agency was unjustly enriched
through the benefits Midler's property right bestowed upon their
76. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
77. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. Id. at 463.
79. Id.
product. The conclusion was reached that "[t]o impersonate her
voice is to pirate her identity."80
Based upon this conclusion, the court held that "when a distinctive
voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imi-
tated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is
not theirs and have committed a tort in California." 8'
Relying upon the Midler court's adherence to the property theory,
this Comment contends that the right of publicity statute in Califor-
nia should be amended to include vocal imitations.82 In addition to
the rationales previously established in favor of the property analysis
of the right of publicity, additional policy reasons exist for extending
the statute to include vocal imitations. These policy reasons are dis-
cussed in the next section.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR INCLUDING "VOCAL IMITATIONS"
UNDER THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The preceding discussion established that a substantive right of
publicity is available for celebrities based upon the property right
interest they possess in their personas. Consequently, this Comment's
suggested expansion of California's statutory right of publicity to in-
clude vocal imitations is based on analogies to the previously dis-
cussed rationales for the right of publicity itself. Additionally, sev-
eral strong policy reasons exist which back up the contention that
vocal imitations of a celebrity's voice should be actionable under the
right of publicity doctrine. They include: (1) the apparent absence of
any legal remedy on behalf of celebrities; (2) the inherent value of
the distinctive voice; (3) encouragement of achievement in a chosen
field; (4) preservation of a celebrity's image; and (5) prevention of
unjust enrichment by "sound-alike" advertisers.
A. Current Absence of Remedy
At present, no remedy exists for a celebrity to obtain the fair mar-
ket value of his or her voice when it is intentionally imitated in com-
mercial advertising. It is clear that no remedy can be found in copy-
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Additional authority for this Comment's suggestion is a similar New York case
in which a celebrity, who invested 40 years in the development of his public personality
as "Mr. New Year's Eve," recovered under New York law against an advertising agency
who used his voice in an advertisement, as was done in the Midler case. Lombardo v.
Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977). The court
held the celebrity's identity was embedded in his distinctive musical style, therefore, he
was entitled to protection based on the fact that he had painstakingly built a public
persona that had marketable status. The court stated: "[T]he imitation is completely
unfair, amounts to a deception of the public, and thus exploits the respondent's property
right in his public personality." Id. at 624, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
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right or trademark law since a style of voice is not copyrightable. As
the court in Midler pointed out, there are too many existent vari-
ables in voice tone and texture to allow it to be copyrighted.
83
By the same token, the right of publicity protects an interest
which copyright law does not protect, since a celebrity's persona or
identity need not be tangibly fixed in a medium of expression to
merit recovery under the right of publicity.84 However, it is impera-
tive that the voice be protected, just as a celebrity's photograph is
protected, because it contains identifiable qualities. For instance, the
Midler court stated: "The human voice is one of the most palpable
ways identity is manifested. . . . At a philosophical level it has been
observed that with the sound of a voice, 'the other stands before
m e.' 85
Absent a remedy for a celebrity in a vocal imitation situation, the
policy rationales for the doctrine itself, which include benefiting
from one's own property right, are abandoned. In order for courts to
uphold these rationales for future applications of the doctrine, they
should utilize the doctrine in all situations where a celebrity's right
of publicity is violated. Accordingly, the absence of any other rem-
edy for a celebrity supports the contention that the right of publicity
should include vocal imitations.
B. Inherent Value of the Distinctive Voice
Secondly, the distinctive voice of a well-known celebrity is valua-
ble to an advertiser, requiring compensation for the use of that value.
"A celebrity's persona [which inherently includes the distinctive
voice] confers an associative value, or economic impact, upon the
marketability of a product. 86 It necessarily follows that an adver-
tiser should pay for that value.
In her dissenting opinion to the Lugosi v. Universal Pictures deci-
sion, former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird set
out the rationale for granting a celebrity recovery for the use of their
associative value as follows:
Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to increase the
value or sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's identity with the prod-
uct and thereby siphoning some of the publicity value or good will in the
celebrity's persona into the product. This use is premised, in part, on public
83. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
84. Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
85. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (citing D. IHDE, LISTENING AND VOICE 77 (1976)).
86. Halpern, supra note 6, at 1242 (emphasis added).
recognition and association with that person's name or likeness, or an abil-
ity to create such recognition.8"
In Midler, the court recognized that Midler's voice was obviously
of some value to the advertising agency since it could not otherwise
explain why the agency would instruct the "sound-alike" singer to
imitate Midler.88 Hence, it is in the interest of fairness that a celeb-
rity receive the value of what the market would have paid for him or
her to perform in the advertisement in person. 89
C. Encouraging Achievement
A third rationale behind allowing recovery for the deliberate com-
mercial imitation of a celebrity voice is that recovery allows for "vin-
dication of the right" of publicity, which, in turn, encourages
achievement in the celebrity's chosen field as well as encouraging
talented individuals to enter publicity-generating professions.90 This
is premised upon the valid assumption that when a performer has a
low expectation of a return from the exploitation of his or her public-
ity value, the financial incentive to create is diminished.91 In today's
highly-marketed society, a significant portion of a celebrity's finan-
cial support could come from commercial exploitation.
In Zacchini, the court established that the right of publicity "pro-
vides an economic incentive to make the investment required to pro-
duce a performance of interest to the public." '92 In essence, it fosters
creativity by protecting individuals who have used their talents to
gain societal recognition. An amendment to the right of publicity
statute would perhaps provide economic incentives for celebrities to
engage in the activities which would build recognition value through
voice. "[T]he law should seek to increase the potential benefits to
society by expanding, rather than contracting, the category of people
who can take advantage of a survivable right of publicity. '93 Al-
lowing recovery for the vocal imitation of a celebrity's voice would
indeed benefit society, as performers would be encouraged to pro-
duce artistic endeavors which ultimately benefit the public.
In sum, providing legal protection for the economic value of one's
identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a pow-
erful incentive to expend the time and resources necessary to develop
87. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834, 603 P.2d 425, 438, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 336 (1979).
88. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
89. Id.
90. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 83i, 837 (6th Cir.
1983).
91. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
92. Id.
93. Comment, supra note 10, at 1714-15.
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the skills required to gain public recognition. It thereby ensures that
individuals reap the rewards of their endeavors.
D. Preservation of the Celebrity's Image
A fourth argument for allowing recovery is that it would aid in
preserving a celebrity's public image by discouraging unauthorized
appropriations of a celebrity's identity. Otherwise, a celebrity may
be degraded by the suggestion that they would lend their identity to
a particular product. For example, Cher, a motion picture star,
claimed that her image as a major celebrity was degraded by the
suggestion that she would grant an exclusive interview to a certain
publication.94 She believed that her efforts to control the projection
of her public image were undeniably disrupted by that suggestion.
Such an unauthorized use in a publication could substantially alter
the celebrity image.
Additionally, consumers are often misled regarding a celebrity's
willingness to associate themselves with the product. Some celebri-
ties choose not to make endorsements.95 A celebrity's decision to ex-
ploit the value of his or her image is a decision that shapes the scope
of their persona and public image. The choice ultimately affects how
they are viewed by the public.
Because celebrities normally make such decisions based on per-
sonal and moral grounds, their choice should be respected and pro-
tected. 6 A celebrity may find any commercial exploitation undesir-
able and offensive. 7 In that situation, the ability of the press to
exploit their image without their consent creates a particularly irri-
tating situation. As Oscar Wilde termed it: "In the old days men had
the rack. Now they have the press."""
Therefore, it has been recommended that society support the deci-
sions of public figures not to commercialize their names whether for
94. Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1120 (1982).
95. Allen v. National Video, Inc,, 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Onassis v.
Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc.2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984).
96. Some relevant considerations for celebrities who choose not to advertise may be
based on those provided within George Keenan's statement: "The immense impact of
commercial advertising. . .tends to encourage passivity, to encourage acquiescence and
uniformity, to place handicaps on individual contemplativeness and creativeness." Kee-
nan, Address to Notre Dame University (May 15, 1953), reprinted in THE GREAT QUO-
TATIONS 5 (G. Seldes ed. 1977).
97. As Jefferson Davis termed it, a public figure may demand: "All we ask is to be
let alone." THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 780 (G. Seldes ed. 1977).
98. 0. WILDE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE 40-41 (1907).
personal or career reasons. The right of publicity is a commercial
asset which a celebrity ought to be able to use in whatever manner
he or she chooses. This right entitles a celebrity to sell or keep his or
her property interest in accordance with the determination of which
use is best in the individual circumstances.9"
One scholar noted:
If society chooses to allow uses of names and likenesses in advertising, it
might prefer that consumers not be misled about the willingness of a celeb-
rity to associate himself with a product or service. It might give celebrities a
cause of action for unconsented uses of names and likenesses in furtherance
of the objective. 100
E. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment
Finally, a fifth rationale for allowing recovery is that the "sound-
alike" advertiser is unjustly enriched by gaining the benefits of the
celebrity image without being burdened by paying the price required
by the celebrity for its use.' 0' This rationale has a direct correlation
with the property rationale for the right of publicity.102 By exploiting
the celebrity's identity without compensation, the advertiser reaps
the benefits of the celebrity's investment in himself. The encroach-
ment upon the property right of celebrities results in unjust
enrichment.0 3
The unauthorized commercial appropriation of the celebrity's
identity converts potential economic value in their identity to an-
other's advantage. The advertiser is thus unjustly enriched, reaping
one of the benefits of the celebrity's investment in himself. There-
fore, loss of potential financial gain for the celebrity occurs. In that
vein, the advertiser usurps both the profit and control of the celeb-
rity's public image.
It is imperative to a correct property analysis that one recognizes
the celebrity image resulted from their own hard work, and that the
celebrity alone should be entitled to the monetary rewards gained
from the use of the image.
104
99. Comment, supra note 10, at 1717.
100. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histo-
ries, 51 TEx. L. REV. 637, 647 (1973).
101. Recent Development, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death
of the Famous, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1251, 1261 (1980). This Recent Development, which
advocates that the right of publicity is a property right, suggests that encroachment upon
a property right results in unjust enrichment.
102. Property can be viewed as a means of protecting an individual from economic
exploitation by others. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957
(1982). This commentator argues that property is not only a means toward economic
expansion, but also of protecting personhood.
103. Recent Development, supra note 101, at 1261.
104. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
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A considerable amount of money, time, and energy is needed to
develop one's prominence in a particular field. In fact, years of labor
may be required before one's skills result in the type of notoriety
which permits an economic return through some sort of commercial
promotion activity. Once a celebrity expends the effort to develop
that property interest, he or she has the right to prevent others from
using the property without permission.105
A celebrity can spend years creating an environment in which
their voice is recognized as a commodity. 06 Therefore, it is necessary
that a celebrity be able to recover for the unauthorized commercial
use of his or her distinctive voice in order to prevent the unjust en-
richment of "sound-alike" advertisers.
In summary, the above mentioned policy rationales, which stem
from the widely-accepted theory that the right of publicity is ulti-
mately a property right, provide a solid basis for the legislative sug-
gestion that follows.
V. LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTION
Based on strong policy arguments, coupled with the federal court's
holding in Midler, this Comment suggests that the California legis-
lature amend Civil Code section 3344(a) to include "vocal imita-
tions.' 0 7 The proposed amended statute would read as follows:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness, or engages in any vocal imitation of a distinctive celeb-
rity voice, in any manner. . .for purposes of advertising or selling, or solic-
iting purchases of products, merchandise, goods or service. . .without such
person's prior consent... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person. . .injured as a result thereof. [Proposed amendment is set out in
italics.]
This amendment would allow a celebrity to recover damages
against a person who unlawfully-uses an imitation of his or her voice
for commercial purposes, such as in "sound-alike" advertisements.
The present day situation appears to be ripe for such a statutory
provision in light of the recent influx of "sound-alike" commercials
in radio and television advertising.
105. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 603 P.2d 425, 438, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 326. (1979).
106. Factors, 579 F.2d at 221.
107. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1990).
CONCLUSION
Under California's current interpretation of the common law right
of publicity, and its statutory counterpart, a celebrity is not afforded
any sort of recovery for the imitation of his or her distinctive voice in
purely commercial settings. This Comment contends that such pro-
tection against the vocal imitation of a celebrity is just as warranted
as the protection currently provided for visual imitations or other ap-
propriations of that celebrity's identity.
A celebrity can spend years creating an environment in which his
or her voice is recognized as a commodity, only to have a person,
who has done nothing to create the recognition, market the commod-
ity and receive a windfall in profits. A solution would best be real-
ized in the form of a statutory amendment to the right of publicity
statute in California allowing celebrities recovery for vocal imita-
tions. This Comment suggests that the status quo requires a quick
remedy.
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